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Lingering Colonialities as
Blocl<ades to Peace Education:
School Violence in Trinidad
Hakim Mohandas Amani WilHains

Introduction
The essence of this chapter is encapsulated quite well by the following
quote;
violence has been constructed by and through a "tunnel vision" that only
reacts to certain individualistic events or isolated circumstances. Tunnel
vision ... is violent in that... it occludes the making and mari<ing of power
... Thus, regimes of power perpetuate material and subjective violence at
the everyday level. (McLaren, Leonardo, and Alien 1999: 145)
By using data on school violence from field research in Trinidad and Tobago
(TT), I argue that "in the knowledge production of 'school violence,' 'school'
is subtracted as a descriptive [term], and in its place is hoisted the category
of 'youth,' inscribed as the 'Other,' the predominant signifier of violence"
(Williams 2013: 49). In so doing, the predominating discourse about what
constitutes school violence itself, and its drivers/'causes,'' takes on a limiting
and individualizing nature. As a result, the principal interventions that emanate
from such a discourse are correspondingly narrow and therefore fail to reveal
the structural violence in which "youth violence in schools" is embedded. I
posit this discursive violence as a lingering coloniality, and thus, as a blockade
to the implementation of sustainable peace education in TT's schools. By
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interrogating discursive violence, 1 demonstrate the need for "a critical
semiotics of violence [that] ... consider[s] relations of power in both the
discourses on violence and the violence of discourse" (McLaren, Leonardo,
and Allen 1999: 147).
In this chapter, I will first provide demographic context on the Caribbean
and TX followed by my conceptual framework and methodology. After a brief
literature review of school and youth violence, my analysis will center on three
government initiatives (safety officers in schools; the TT Violence Prevention
Academy; and a same-sex pilot project) that do not address the structural
violence within the educational system inTT but instead narrowly train their
gaze on the mere "symptoms" of school violence, i will then conclude with a
few suggestions on how to more comprehensively address school violence.
In the section on context that immediately follows, I provide many
statistics regarding crime, violence and other related issues in the Caribbean.
The statistical litany may strike the reader as ironic against the backdrop of
my overall argument of interrogating the discursive violence around school or
youth violence. 1 do run the risk of reinforcing pathologized narratives about
the Caribbean and poor, black/brown people. However, the statistics are real
and we cannot hide from them. Thus, throughout this chapter, I intend to
undercut the positivistic inclination to frame statistics as the comprehensive
picture, via my usage of rich, qualitative data and critical analysis.

Context
The Caribbean region has one of the highest murder rates in the world (30 per
100,000 annually) (World Bank 2007), compared to the global average of 6.2
per 100,000 (UNODC 2013). Rates of youth homicides in the Caribbean (31.6
per 100,000 in 2005)^ are the second highest in the world (Hoffman, Knox, and
Cohen 2011). Additionally, the region has the second highest HIV/AIDS rates
in the world (Jules 2010), and narco-trafficking (World Bank 2007), money
laundering (Goddard 2011), and global warming/climate change have become
major challenges (Barker, Dodman, and McGregor 2009).
In the Caribbean, TT is a leader on several fronts. Business-wise, it is
a major manufacturer and exporter, and it has sizable oil and natural gas
reserves. With a US$27 billion GDP it is considered a non-OECD, high-income
country (World Bank 2014). With a 0.766 rating on the Human Development
Index (HDD, TT is ranked sixty-fourth out of 187 countries (UNDP 2014).
Conversely, TT's poverty rate represents 21.8 percent of the population
(Trinidad Guardian 2012), and the country ranks eighty-ninth out of 162 nations
on the Global Peace Index (GPI) (lEP 2014),^ with perceived criminality, violent
crime, and access to weapons being noted as great concerns. TT's homicide
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rate for 2013 was 31.2 per 100,000 (TTCrime.com n.d.), rising from a low of
7.52 in 1998. This uptick in crime and violence has been accompanied by an
increase in school violence as well (Phillips 2008). Despite the outcry against
crime and violence in the Caribbean and TT, there is a dearth of data and
research around youth violence (Deosaran 2007; UNDP 2012).

Youth and School Violence
Youth violence is not unique to TT; in fact, it is considered a "universal
problem" (Plucker 2000: 2), as is school violence (Benbenishty and Astor
2008). Violence, writ large, has become an issue for the development project
(World Bank 2007) and for public health (Moser and van Bronkhorst 1999).
Within and beyond these domains, there has been increasing attention paid
to youth, which some view as a neoliberal ploy to subsume youth into the
logics of consumerism and human capital development (Giroux 2010; Sukarieh
andTannock 2015). Youth are also hemmed in by several discourses: that of
"juvenile delinquency" (Sukarieh and Tannock 2008) and that of criminality
(Giroux 2000). However, my research and activist focus onTT youth emanate
from my desire to "expand the conceptual framework of the discourse on
violence" (Spina, 2000: xix). I have narrowed my analysis to school violence
because the school as research site is a nexus of global, regional, national,
and local influences. Additionally, the school is a proximal context, in terms of
its centrality to child development (Baker 1998) because of all the time youth
spend in that socializing space. Schools can play a role as well in reinforcing
or disrupting violence (Seydlitz and Jenkins 1998).
School violence "is a complex social problem" (Baker 1998: 36), but it has
been blighted by media sensationalism and restrictive conceptualizations.
There are now undercurrents of managerialism and neoliberalism beneath
contemporary global policyscapes (Atkinson 2004); this is accompanied/
impelled by an increasing fiduciary retreat of the state from educational
provisions (Kumar and Hill 2008). Stringent accountability measures and
privatization of public sen/ices—ideas borrowed from the business world—
are just a few examples of this neo-managerialism/neo-liberalism in education.
These processes, and the discourses that impel them, view education, rather
reductively, as a linear system of easily traceable causal interactions (Radford
2008). Emergent from this are standardized and large-scale approaches
to education and research^ that are ill-equipped to tackle social inequities,
because they do not comprehensively account for complexity and diversity
(Lees 2007). Similarly, these restrictive discourses and processes inform a
"standardised model of healthy youth development" (Sukarieh and Tannock
2008: 306).
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Schools are complex systems and violence is a complex phenomenon; and
because complex systems are constituted by a potentially unlimited array of
variables (Radford 2008), researchers and practitioners are increasingly calling
for ecological, multifaceted, interdisciplinary and comprehensive approaches
to school violence (Baker 1998; Barbanel 2005; Henry 2009; Winslade and
Williams 2012). Broadened conceptualizations thus define school violence as:
any acts, relationships, or processes that use power over others, exercised
by whatever means, such as structural, social, physical, emotional, or
psychological, in a school or school-related setting or through the organi
zation of schooling and that harm another person or group of people.
(Henry 2009: 1253)
Harber (2004: 44) insists that the use of the word "power" widens prevalent
conceptualizations of violence.'' In this definition, it thus becomes almost
preclusive to train the gaze solely on youth when analyzing and addressing
school violence. Additionally, when a comprehensive, systems approach
is employed with school violence, the interventions are necessarily broad,
ranging from the micro to the meso to the macro. Different tiers/types of
intervention are important because violence often has multiple "causes."
In this chapter, I will argue that the three interventions thatTT's Government
employed in schools, as well as the mostly negative peace-oriented® interven
tions at the one secondary school (Survivors Secondary School [SSS]) where
I conducted my research, fail to comprehensively address school violence
because they are myopic, anemically-conceptualized, and ill-implemented via
exclusionary means; all characteristics that I posit as lingering colonialities.
I use this term "lingering colonialities" not to mean that every structure or
process from the colonial era is extant in TT's schools, but to convey that
it is more so an ethos—one of rigidity, hierarchy, control, docilization, and
exclusion—that lingers and shapes contemporary relationships, structures,
and processes.

Conceptual Framework
This research is anchored within the fields of international development, peace
education, and Caribbean studies. The conceptual framework that shaped my
research, and this particular analysis, is constituted by postcolonial theory
and critical peace education. I believe that postpolonial countries, as a result
of their histories, have much to offer in terms of research; I concur with
Amin-Khan's (2012: 18) argument that the creation/formation of the European
nation-state is very different to that of the postcolonial state: "from the
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colonial to the postcolonial era, Africa, Asia and Latin America have taken
diametrically dissimilar trajectories of national identity, state, and societal
formation compared with Europe and North America."
Postcolonial theory can facilitate historical revisitations, and help elucidate and
critique discontinuities and contemporary structures and processes in former
colonies, likeTT As an interrogative and generative tool, postcolonial theory can
be utilized to not only expose the porosity of master discourses but also provide
new or different questions/insights/directions (Jabri 2013; Tikly 1999). Critical
peace education (CPE) is concerned with analyzing power dynamics and intersectionality in teasing out varied "invisibilities" (Bajaj and Brantemeier 2011); it
is also attentive to localized experiences. CPE is not just focused on a cessation
of direct/material violence (negative peace) but more so on the cessation of
structural violence (positive peace). Postcolonial theory, combined with critical
peace education to form a type of praxis, thus permits me to interrogate school
violence in the context of educational inequity as postcolonial structural violence
(see Williams 2013). Threaded together, these two strands form a postcolonial
critical peace education research framework to analyze data from a region of the
world that is generally under-studied/under-represented in the academy.

AAethodoiogy
Proceeding on the premise that school violence interventions ought to be
context specific (Astor et al. 2005), I conducted qualitative research in one
secondary school. Research around youth violence in schools indicates that
much of it occurs in urban areas (Phillips 2008), as does violence in general;
I therefore selected a coed school in the capital. Port of Spain. My study
resembled what Vavrus and Bartlett (2009) call a vertical case study;® one
in which you factor in multiple tiers' to your analysis, which is especially
requisite when trying to apprehend complex phenomena such as school
violence. I chose a school that had many students from economicallydepressed communities because I was interested in how their communities
impacted their lives; in a sense, it was a school on the margins of society with
students from marginalized communities. Smith (2012) avers that conducting
research on the "margins" sometimes gives great insight into the wider
society; the margins, though ignored, are often dialectically constituted by
both oppression and resistance. In terms of my own positionality, I grew
up in a similarly marginalized/impoverished community in TT therefore this
research, which I view as partial solidarity with these students, is the type for
which critical peace education calls.
I spent from December 2009 to June 2010 at SSS.® I conducted participant
observations, nine focus groups/classroom discussions with eighty-four
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students and semi-structured interviews witli two administrators, two safety
officers, one guidance counselor, four deans, twenty teachers, and four
Ministry of Education (MoE) officials.® I returned for three weeks of observa
tions and a follow-up in May/June 2013.1 returned for another three weeks in
June, 2015. This study has thus become longitudinal. SSS (in 2010) had about
850 students and the male/female ratio was about 60/40.
As for my actual analysis, grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990)
permitted the data to percolate upward, so to speak; beads of data coagu
lated into themes and those became the bedrock of my analysis.

Data
Many colonial apparatuses were bequeathed to postcolonial societies (Danns
2013), and educational systems were oftentimes part of this inheritance. TT's
educational system has emerged as a bifurcated system (Williams 2012):
part of the system (called traditional grammar or "prestige" schools) created
during the colonial era and run by various religious denominations, and part
(much larger, and called new sector schools) created in the independence
era to facilitate mass education (Campbell 1997). It was in 1960 that religious
denominations negotiated to maintain their control of the schools under their
purview. The resultant agreement, the Concordat, is still in place and assures
that top academic performers, on the national exam, from primary school are
funneled into these traditional grammar/"prestige" schools.
SSS is one of these new sector schools built in the post-independence
era (in the late 1970s). My research was guided by one simple question, with
three subparts: how stakeholders at SSS conceptualized school violence, its
influences/"causes," and its interventions. Per the focus of this paper, I am
most concerned with the responses to the subpart on interventions.
Most participants (including students) reduced school violence to youth
violence, and most conceptualizations (about 97 percent) centered on direct/
material violence. As regards my participants' views on the influences/"causes"
of school violence, I received diverse responses, but most of them were
more of an individualist nature than structural; i.e. most (including students)
made attributions to students' homes, parents, and communities rather than
to school, societal, or more macro-structural factors (see Williams [2012;
2013] for more on this).
In terms of interventions, I divided these primal'ily into negative peaceoriented (i.e. those focused on the mere cessation of direct violence) and
positive-peace oriented (i.e. those aimed at inculcating a culture of peace,
or being more preventative, etc.; in short, those striding toward some type
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of dismantling of structural violence). Of all the interventions reported that
were used at SSS, about two-thirds of them were of a negative peace orien
tation.'" Some of these included: corporal punishment (punches, pinches,
whipping/caning), corporeal surveillance (such as uniform inspections), law
enforcement, expulsion, suspension, writing lines, scolding, community
service (i.e. cleaning the school grounds so as to engender embarrassment),
and deprivations (time-outs, detentions). Some positive-peace-oriented inter
ventions included: use of guidance counselor. Adolescent Development
Program, Families in Action, Arts in Action, Rapport,''^ student council, student
awards (called testimonials), student support services, and teacher-to-student
counseling.
At SSS, I witnessed all of these interventions being deployed, both
negative and" positive-peace-oriented ones, and I saw instances where both
had an impact. Nonetheless, the majority of interventions employed negativepeace approaches. I believe this is connected to an outgrowth of the narrow
conceptualizations of violence itself, including the culturally ritualized tradi
tions and histories of dealing with violence inTT. While some of the in-school
interventions were positive-peace oriented, it seems that almost all of the
major interventions crafted/implemented by, or via, the Ministry of Education
(MoE) were simply meant to quell, rather than-prevent, direct violence: (1)
use of safety officers, (2) the TT Violence Prevention Academy, and (3) the
same-sex pilot project. Later in the chapter, 1 will provide more detail on these
three programs.
Before my research started, however, there was an MoE Peace Promotion
Programme (PPP). Its goal was
to create a culture of peace—in the individual, the school, the home, the
community, and the society at large. It aims to build up a defense and resil
ience against any tendency or inducement to violence and indiscipline ...
teachers are our key agents and front line "soldiers" as we "wage peace"
against violence. (Ministry of Education of Trinidad and Tobago n.d.)
Despite the quasi-militaristic language regarding teachers as "soldiers waging
peace," the core of this program seemed laudable in promoting positive
peace. It included training in mediation, confliction resolution, parenting
classes, classroom management for teachers as "alternatives for corporal
punishment," peer counseling, and stress and anger management classes for
students. The MoE noted on its website that "The Ministry intends to stay the
course towards the ultimate creation of a Culture of Peace in the individual,
the school, the family and society at large." However, the name of this
program was changed because, as one MoE official told me in confidence,
"peace implied war" and the MoE (and by extension the government) did not
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want to convey that a "war" was taking place (interview March 9, 2010). This
highlighted the politicized nature of addressing violence in TT
During my seven months at SSS and my first three-week follow-up, I saw
little evidence of this program in action (i.e. courses on mediation, conflict
resolution, parenting classes, etc.), let alone the MoE "staying the course."
This positive-peace-oriented program, with its emphasis on multi-sectoral
collaboration, may have potentially fostered impactful changes in secondary
schools in TT Whatever the reasons for its dismantling or limited implemen
tation, the MoE did not stay the course on this intervention but, instead,
pursued the three aforementioned negative peace-oriented interventions
which I will detail below.

Three Examples of Governmental Negative
Peace-oriented Interventions
1. Safety Officers
Safety officers, as a result of an "effort between Ministry of Education and
National Security to curb violence in the school system" (interview with Mr.
Joseph (safety officer) March 15, 2010), were "deployed" to many schools
that had a significant problem with "youth violence." Many of these officers
were former police officers; they dressed in civilian clothing and "patrolled"
the school's grounds often. They broke up fights and in some cases, meted
out corporal punishment.'^ A teacher, Ms. Wellers, spoke about adult-tostudent violence (a type rarely critically interrogated by the adults at SSS);
"1 have seen those officers in charge ... the guards or safety officers ... and
they use equal force on the children"'^ (interview May 7, 2010). This is an
excerpt, from my field notes, that illustrated how one of the safety officers
"manhandled" a student;
It is a particularly hot day in the deans' room and I hear Mr. Hawke's voice
booming rage. He is yelling at someone. He and a male student enter
the deans' room. He has gripped the student by his arm quite tightly. He
instructs, very loudly, for the student to sit down. He yells "do you think
I am an ass?" The student seems a bit fearful but is also attempting to
appear "cool" and unfazed. Mr. Hawkeyells "answer meh'"!" and throws
a chair down; the student flinches so as not to be hit by the chair. Students
are passing by and peering in .... One of the deans interjects and says "ok,
ok ... we will take it from here." (April 2010)
At SSS, both safety officers were male, where^ all deans were female. From
my observations, I believe this played a role in either sometimes pacifying
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or inciting tensions between tlie safety officers and students. Sometimes
the safety officers were able to command respect by exerting their physical
comparative advantage over the students (mostly male students), and other
times, this exertion fostered opposition from male students so that they would
save face in front of their peers. It would seem that, for both student and
safety officer, masculine performativity was part Of their in-school personas/
identities,'® and this has implications for the efficacy of this particular inter
vention (i.e. use of safety officers in schools). It may have, in the short term,
procured obedience and "submission" on the students' part, but did it really
get at the subterranean energy that fueled the issues for which the students
were being reprimanded?

2. TT Violence Prevention Academy (TTVPA)
There were similar themes regarding this intervention. The TTVPA was a
"violence reduction program" run out of a center at Arizona State University
by several criminologists,'® at the behest of theTT MoE. Twenty-five schools
across the country were selected (based on levels of school violence), one
of which was SSS. By the time I had begun my research, the TTVPA had
already been implemented. It ran from September 2008 (with initial meetings
and school visits by the VPA team) to May 2010 when the final report was
due to the MoE. Its goals and premise were to equip in-school staff with
the capabilities to craft school-specific, evidence-based violence prevention
plans. The four-pronged approach would entail: training staff, then creating,
implementing, and evaluating a school-specific plan (ASU Center for Violence
Prevention and Community Safety 2010).
As per official descriptions, theTTVPA seemingly featured all the hallmarks
of effective violence prevention/reduction programs; "comprehensive,"
"integrated," "evidence-based," "tailored to the specific needs of each
school," and "sustainability." After VPA teams visited each school, they
assembled small teams (of in-school staff) to carry out the programs. There
weren't any students or parents on these teams.
In the final report, the VPA identified several issues that I did observe
at SSS; poor, unsafe physical conditions that hindered effective classroom
instruction, and teacher absenteeism which resulted in many classes being
unsupervised, during which fights among students would often ensue. These
were indeed factors that detracted from an ideal learning environment and
much of school violence research affirms the vitality of the school climate
and supportive school structures/processes in violence prevention/reduction
(Baker 1998; Benbenishty and Astor 2005; Embry and Flannery 1999; Osher
et al. 2004). However, the team at SSS chose gambling as the issue it
wished to address." 1 posit that the VPA strategies seemed to have been of
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a negative-peace orientation, and not focused on student empowerment and
disrupting/transforming structural violence (positive peace). Granted that the
VPA was not a self-described peace education intervention; 1 argue that its
design and implementation, in being primarily negative peace-oriented, may
not have done much in "exposing and upending societal inequities that may
undergird manifestations of youth violence" (Williams, 2015).
Gambling was indeed a problem at SSS, as reported by my research
participants, and fights did ensue as a result of students losing money or not
wanting to pay, etc. But gambling proved to be a simulacrum of violence and
revealed little about the subterranean energy that fed it. Ms. Seepersad, a
teacher and administrator at SSS, addressed the diverse reasons that may
have compelled students to gamble:
They gamble for money, they gamble to live, they gamble for food, they
gamble for taxi money, they gamble if they want a gold chain. That is their
way of earning, getting money, so they started having it in school and
would have fights as a result; who did not give who their money; all kind
of different things. So we had a serious problem. (Interview May 19, 2010)
While some of these reasons do seem obvious, such as mere entertainment
or materialist desires, some students gambled to obtain money to eat or to
cover transportation costs on their return journey home. At SSS, there was
a government-sponsored program that provided free lunches, but some
students (both male and female) were ashamed to be seen taking any;'® it
therefore may have been the case where students may not have had lunch
or money to buy lunch and may have refused to partake in the governmentsubsidized lunch program.
Though I argue that the VPA co-opted some terminology such as
"sustainable" and ''comprehensive" to gain legitimacy, a closer inspection
revealed other factors that may have resulted in its short-sighted approach.To
be clear, I am not assigning full blame to the architects of the VPA, for the fault
lines may run closer to the locally-appropriated ways of implementation which
may have undercut the successes of this program. However, by not having
students and parents on the team, the issue that was selected conformed
with narrow conceptualizations of violence and its putative "causes." The
restricted understandings around school violence thereby limited the scope
of the interventions, which is one of my central arguments. If the VPA was
indeed "comprehensive," it would have insisted on being more inclusionary.'®
However, I suspect that the very epistemological roots of the VPA—crimin
ology—viewed crime and violence in particular ways that were perhaps
incongruent with the participatory ways of-knowing and being for which the
critical research on school violence strongly advocates.
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3. Same-sex Pilot Project
A third government intervention was a same-sex pilot project. While I was
wrapping up research in June 2010, an MoE representative visited a staff
meeting and announced that, as of that Septernber, SSS would slowly
transition from a coed to an all-male school (starting with an all-male student
cohort). Prior to this visit, teachers and students were already of the belief that
male students were the source of most school violence; this decision from the
MoE merely exacerbated their concerns. The MoE representative said that the
decision was based primarily on three reasons: (1) that research showed that
students in same-sex schools were not as distracted and thus tended to do
better academically, (2) without the distractions of the "girls," the boys may
have focused more on their school-work and not have gotten into as much
trouble, and (3) that the top-performing schools inTT were single-sex. The MoE
was thus projecting this pilot as having a potential impact on school violence.
After this announcement, teachers and students believed that direct
violence would have increased at SSS. In a focus group discussion, some
boys voiced their thoughts on the impending single-sex change;
Researcher:
Steven:

... eventually it's going to turn into all boys ... What you think
about all boys [being here]?
That is madness because all boys ... boys are just violence.
(Student Focus Group with 2bSG June 17, 2010)

One teacher/administrator, Ms. Seepersad, felt demotivated by this change.
She essentially agreed with the students' forecast: "what you [are] really
doing is putting all the gangs into one school... What I see is just more work
for us [and] more stress" (interview May 19, 2010). As an affirmation, during
my May/June 2013 follow-up (three years after the pilot's implementation),
teachers informed me that violence did indeed increase. One teacher, Ms.
Lockby, told me that the three-year pilot was difficult and that they (the
teachers) were simply trying to "keep the peace" instead of focusing on
teaching (brief informal conversation June 2013). The pilot project that began
in 2010 was ended under a different government and Minister of Education.
There wasn't any comprehensive evaluation conducted that involved seeking
the perspectives of varied stakeholders; therefore the full impact, both
strengths and limitations, of this pilot went largely unanalyzed. SSS thus
resorted to a coed school again.
The grounds on which the MoE supposedly made this decision to have
a same-sex pilot in twenty-five schools were quite controvertible, as the
research on same-sex schools has been mostly inconclusive (Lingard,
Martino and Mills 2009). The MoE's usage of the fact that the top-performing
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schools in TT are mostly same-sex to fuel its argument omitted a consid
eration that these schools possess considerable social capital because they
were created in the colonial era. The top academic students from primary
schools are funneled into these "prestige" schools (which are also allowed,
under the Concordat, to keep 20 percent of their placements for whomever
they wish to admit. It is most likely that these seats are assigned to those
of economic/ political means in TT). These "prestige" schools thus maintain
their academic dominance and the same-sex variable is but one among many
that ought to be considered when analyzing the successes of these schools.
Yet, this inten/ention was narrowly conceived because the analysis was not
as inclusive and comprehensive as it should have been. It did not address the
structural violence of the educational system (e.g. taking a closer look at the
disequilibrium engendered by the Concordat), but instead was short term and
ended prematurely.

Conclusion
The examples I give in this chapter demonstrate that narrow conceptualiza
tions of school violence thus inform ultimately ineffectual interventions; and
that these interventions are shaped by lingering colonialities, some of which
are: exclusionary practices and structural dispositions; rigid, unitary epistemologies; punishment as social control; and narrow hierarchies/top-down
processes.^® The three government interventions represented ramped-up
investments in securitization, a move that has occurred in other countries as
they seek to address school violence. Lingering colonialities, by their rigidity
to change, act as blockades to radical, critical alternatives aimed at disman
tling structural violence.
I argue that the-parameters of defining school violence inTT need to be
widened. Maintaining a strict definitional focus solely on youth and mostly on
direct/material violence constitutes a form of discursive violence, because as
such, it "symbolically inscribes student subjectivities" (McLaren, Leonardo,
and Allen 2000: 68), and conceals the role of power relations (McLaren,
Leonardo, and Allen 1999). By focusing on youth and direct/material violence
in TT's schools, policy makers and school actors suppress critical and
sustained questions about "prestige" schools (and the influence of their
social and economic capital), under-resourced schools like SSS, and culturallysanctioned violence like corporal punishment.^'While these are all seemingly
disparate elements, collectively they constitute a multitiered process that
functions to maintain the educational status quo in TT
I concur with Pohlandt-McCormick's (2000) assertion that a type of
discursive/rhetorical violence—beyond physical violence—does render a kind
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of psychological harm and interrupts'people's abilities to mal<e sense of their
experiences. Further, discursive violence works to gut the colonial influence
from postcolonial memory so that history goes unchallenged, "thus cancelling
the possibility of a radical collectivity" (McLaren, Leonardo, and Allen 1999:
160). Framed as epistemic violence, these processes can mute the voices
of the marginalized (Dotson 2011). Case in point: at SSS, the principal was
the sole participant who mentioned/intimated about the intersection of TT's
colonial history and contemporary school violence.
This sort of discursive violence can lead to "system blindness" (Oshry
1995), where people, enmeshed in their particular context, are not able
to see the whole picture because power relations are concealed from
the analytic gaze. Envisioning peace processes as nonlinear, complex,
and interdependent (Korppen and Ropers 2011) permjts a revisitation of
ill-conceived, myopic interventions. While it is understood that conflict is
ubiquitous (Vallacher et al. 2013) and inevitable, violence is not necessarily
inevitable (Winslade and Williams 2012). Research shows that youth violence
is preventable (which I will detail a bit below) (Hoffman, Knox, and Cohen
2011). Therefore, interventions that may escalate or incite violence need
to be rigorously contested; structural violence can no longer be ignored.
Moreover, top-down, rigid discipline can have negative effects (Benbenishty
and Astor 2008); zero tolerance policies and approaches may not equip youth
with capacities to resolve conflicts (Winslade and Williams 2012); and cookiecutter or suppression-only models do not work very well (Hoffman, Knox, and
Cohen 2011b).
It is vital that we recognize that both negative and positive peace
approaches'^ are needed as a holistic framework (Harris 2000; lEP 2012),
and, in line with my overall argument, there need to be multilevel initiatives
to address school violence. These include: cognitive-behavioral skills training
(individual level), tackling domestic violence, child abuse, and parental mental
illness (family level), addressing inadequate housing conditions; police-youth
mentoring programs (community level), limiting firearms; and addressing
lack of economic and educational opportunities (national level) (Hoffman,
Knox, and Cohen 2011). Additionally, policy makers and educators should
distinguish outcomes from inputs and recognize that the drivers of violence
and the drivers of peace may be very different (lEP 2012). Conflict resolution
should be actively taught in schools and classroom management practices
should center more on character development than behavior management
(Baker 1998). School psychologists and social workers can play vital roles in
providing necessary support for students (Astor et al. 2005; Baker 1998), and
high-quality early childhood education/investments can be strong preventative
measures (Astor et al. 2005; Hoffman, Knox, and Cohen 2011). I argue that
across all levels in the education system, families and communities need
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to be involved. In sum, we need to build "humane school communities"
(Noguera 2008: IIO).'^
To reiterate, any productive analysis of school violence has to encompass
the intra- and inter-personal, wider institutional practices and the particular
political economy; omitting considerations of macro inequalities and struc
tural violence narrows the interventions and reinforces the status quo (Henry
2009). In my research, I have documented many instances and processes
that demonstrate lingering colonialities; chief among which is a rigidity to
alternative ways of being and seeing. In so doing, structural violence remains
buffered from interrogation and that becomes a major blockade to the imple
mentation of comprehensive critical peace education interventions. This is
indeed a social justice agenda. And while we acknowledge that the social
justice approach has never been dominant in education (Hytten 2006), striving
to mainstream these ideas/strategies toward a sustainable peace is both very
much laudable and possible.
Everything in this third-world present-moment,
emits familiar and unfamiliar yellows.
Our eyes are jaundiced by our past,
but which yellow is of yesterday,
and which is of the now?
Written by h.m.a.w.
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Notes
1

I put the word causes in quotes so as to subtly impugn the assertive and
too oft-definitive tone around the causes of school violence. In this chapter,
I will use the word influence alongside causes to indicate my hesitancy.

2

The GPI is generated by Vision of Hunnanity under the auspices of the
Institute for Economics and Peace (lEP).The GPI measures three main
domains: level of safety/security, extent of domestic and international
conflict, and degree of militarization. The methodology is laid out more
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comprehensively online at: http://www.visi0n0fhumanity.0rg/#/page/
news/920. As regards TT, the country received 4/5 for perceived criminality,
5/5 for homicides, 4/5 for access to weapons, and 5/5 for violent crime
(with 5 being the highest; closer to 1 is better).
3

4

Such restrictive standardization is enforced bypositivist notions of what
counts as evidence and research. Smith (2012: 58) states "research
'through imperial eyes' describes which assumes that Western ideas about
the most fundamental things are the only ideas possible to hold, certainly
the only rational ideas, and the only ideas which can make sense of the
world, of reality, of social life and of human beings."
A similar analytic framework is symbolic violence, as postulated by Bourdieu
and Passeron (1977). Waldron (2009: 611) states "rather than focus solely
on youth-created violence, symbolic violence broadens our understanding
of violence to include institutionally perpetuated forms of school violence."
Some educational researchers call this "systemic violence" (Epp and
Watkinson 1996).

5

In peace education, negative-peace approaches are those aimed at a
cessation of direct/material violence, whereas positive-peace approaches
go a step further and are focused on dismantling structural violence. The
former is necessary but insufficient in the calculus of sustainable peace.

6

See Bajaj (2012) for a thorough example of a vertical case study in peace
education.

7

The multiple tiers include: international proliferation of small arms and
the drug trade, Caribbean regional and Trinidad national context of crime
and violence, the MoE (Ministry of Education), SSS, classroom-level and
individual stakeholders such as students, teachers, etc.

8

The school's name and the participants' names are pseudonyms. I have
altered some of the school's details to conceal its identity as much as
possible.

9

SSS featured Forms 1-6 (US equivalent of Grades 6-12; Form 6 = Grades 11
and 12). Student participants were from Forms 1-5, and represented about
10 percent of all students. Focus groups were students who volunteered,
and class discussions were based on recommendations by administrators
and deans based on a mixture of what they perceived to be either
"well-behaved" or "troublesome" classes. At SSS, there were two safety
officers, one guidance counselor, about eighty teachers, and four deans.
Principal and Vice Principal were the primary administrators; some teacher
participants were also administrators (i.e. Heads of Department). As for MoE
officials, most were high-ranking involved in research, divisional supervision,
or in the leadership of National Student Services/School Discipline initiatives;
I selected them because of their expertise/"bird's eye" view.

10 I had asked all participants some variant of the question "what interventions
are used here at SSS to address school violence?" or "how is school
violence dealt with/addressed here at SSS?"
11 These four programs were implemented, with MoE support, by different
NGOs. Each program worked with "problem youth" or "trouble" classes.
The Adolescent Development Program aimed at providing students with
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information about teenage pregnancy, AIDS, sexuality, etc. Families in
Action was focused on peer mediation/ mentorship, and leadership training.
Arts in Action used arts-based programs (i.e. dance, visual arts, music)
to tackle issues like bullying. Rapport was about providing education to
students around issues such as AIDS and safe sex practices.
12 See Williams (2013: 57) for a description of my detailed observations of
a safety officer whipping/caning a student who had been fighting with
another student.
13 "Equal force" here implied that the safety officers used physical force with
perhaps the same intensity reserved for adult-to-adult interaction.
14 "meh" isTrinidadian dialect for "me."
15 See Williams (2014) for a much deeper discussion of the intersection of
masculinity and school violence at SSS; in this article, I use neocolonial
hegemonic masculinity as my analytic framework.
16 Waldron (2009) asserts that criminologists have dominated the field of
school violence research.
17 I have discussed this choice of gambling as an evasionary tactic from
tackling structural violence at SSS (see Williams 2015).
18 Students did not tell me this directly but I often overheard some students
expressing to school staff or to each other that they were ashamed to be
seen taking these lunches.
19 Toohey (2013: 1) argues that "one form of structural violence may be simply
to exclude different voices from decision making or the construction of
peace. Thus, people are denied their full potential by being kept out of
problem definition."
20 There are several other "lingering colonialities" that I observed during my
data collection. Because of space constraints, I am not able to elaborate
here. However, in Williams (2012, 2013), 1 offer rich data and analysis about
uniforms, corporal punishment, steep hierarchies, and outdated pedagogies,
just to name a few.
21 Since about 1999, the MoE has banned the use of corporal punishment
in schools; however, its usage continues. Harris (2000, 18) argues that
"physical means of disciplining children provide bad role models of conflict
resolution, lower children's self-esteem, and make it difficult for children to
trust adults—all of which are counterproductive to school success."
22 See Harris (2013; edited volume) for accounts of peace education
grassroots efforts across the world.
23 I am aware that most (if not all) of the measures listed here are not based
specifically on the Caribbean context. More research is needed to ascertain
the cross-cultural commensurability of these measures.

